fix(build): build-packages.sh passes -d; docs: apt repo published + signed

build-packages.sh omitted -d, so dpkg-checkbuilddeps silently dropped
arch:all packages (incl. secubox-core) from the repo. All 144 packages now
build + are published to apt.secubox.in, signed with apt@secubox.in.

.claude/HISTORY.md

@@ -3,6 +3,102 @@
 
 ---
 
+## 2026-06-15 — APT repo: all packages published + signed (apt.secubox.in)
+
+Made the apt repo at `https://admin.gk2.secubox.in/repo/` (served from
+`/var/www/apt.secubox.in`, manager `repoctl`/reprepro) carry **all** packages.
+
+- **Was broken**: pool had 15 orphan debs with an **empty reprepro DB** and no
+  working signature — the published signing key `packages@secubox.in`
+  (fp 31848880…) has **no private key on the board**.
+- **Signing** (user chose on-board `apt@secubox.in`, fp 219BA872…): imported its
+  secret into the repo GPG home (`/var/lib/secubox-repo/gpg`), wrote
+  `conf/distributions` (`SignWith: 219BA872…`) + `conf/options`, re-published
+  `secubox-keyring.gpg` + `FINGERPRINT.txt`. `InRelease`/`Release.gpg` now
+  **Good signature**. (install.sh doesn't pin the fp — transparent.)
+- **Built all 144 packages** (`-d`, arch:all) + `reprepro includedeb bookworm`
+  → 288 entries (×2 arch), 145 debs in pool, current versions
+  (core 1.1.6, threat-analyst 1.4.4, vm 1.0.1, toolbox 2.6.37, hub 1.4.3).
+  WebUI `/api/v1/repo/packages` lists 288. Served + signed via nginx :9080.
+- **Tooling fix**: `scripts/build-packages.sh` now passes `-d` to
+  dpkg-buildpackage (it omitted it → dpkg-checkbuilddeps silently dropped
+  secubox-core and others from every build). 1 pkg failed (sentinelle-gsm,
+  buildinfo artifact race — deb still produced).
+
+**Blocker for public HTTPS (separate, pre-existing):** `apt.secubox.in` via
+HAProxy returns 503 because the **WAF mitmproxy LXC is crash-looping**
+(restart #45552, `PermissionError: /home/mitmproxy/.mitmproxy/config.yaml`),
+which downs the `mitmproxy_inspector` backend → ALL WAF-inspected vhosts 503
+(analyse.gk2 etc., not just apt). Repo is reachable internally (nginx :9080)
+and via the `/repo/` WebUI; public apt URL needs the WAF restored.
+
+## 2026-06-15 — threat-analyst: global security overview (1.4.3, live on gk2)
+
+`secubox-threat-analyst` 1.4.1 → 1.4.3, merged via **PR #598 (closes #597)**,
+built + deployed live on gk2.
+
+- **#597** — threat-analyst page becomes a **global security overview**: all
+  metrics dynamic, fed live from WAF + CrowdSec + firewall. New cached
+  `/overview` endpoint (double-buffer, 60 s background refresh →
+  `overview.json`) aggregating WAF (`/run/secubox/waf.sock /stats`: threats
+  today, blocked 24 h, rules loaded), CrowdSec (detection: alerts), firewall
+  (enforcement: IPs blocked in nft via crowdsec-firewall-bouncer). WebUI gains
+  a "Vue globale sécurité" card row + source health line (`loadOverview()` in
+  `loadAll()`).
+- **Privilege-safe sourcing**: daemon runs as unprivileged `secubox` user →
+  `cscli`/`nft list` (both root-only) failed silently. Switched to CrowdSec's
+  privilege-free **Prometheus :6060** (`cs_alerts` + `cs_active_decisions`).
+  No privilege escalation, no coupling to broken `secubox-blacklist-sync`.
+- Also carried the **1.4.2 build-safe postinst** fix (#595/#596) which had
+  not yet reached the board (was at 1.4.1; `deb-systemd-helper` enable).
+- Live verified: CrowdSec 3712 alerts / 29312 active decisions, firewall
+  29312 blocked, WAF 140 rules; `/overview` 200 via socket **and** aggregator
+  proxy (aggregator restarted to re-discover the new route).
+
+**Found, not fixed (separate):** `secubox-blacklist-sync.service` is **failed**
+(#521, exit 2) → `secubox_blacklist` nft sets empty. Does not affect the
+overview (firewall count comes from the bouncer via Prometheus).
+
+### 1.4.4 — real CrowdSec ingestion (#599, PR #600)
+
+The overview cards populated, but the **headline stats + Top-N leaderboards
+stayed 0**: `collect_crowdsec_alerts()` shelled out to bare `cscli`, which
+fails for the unprivileged `secubox` user → `alerts.jsonl` empty.
+
+- **Read-only sudo ingestion** (backend only; frontend stays value-only):
+  collector now runs `sudo -n /usr/bin/cscli alerts list -o json -l 200`.
+  Ships `/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-analyst` (only `cscli alerts/decisions
+  list *`, read-only), `visudo`-validated in postinst (self-removes if bad).
+- **`NoNewPrivileges=no`** on the unit so sudo can escalate — matches the
+  sibling `secubox-crowdsec` / `secubox-waf` units (`NoNewPrivileges=yes`
+  had blocked sudo: "no new privileges flag is set").
+- **Auto-collect loop** (~5 min) fills the DB without the page open; severity
+  mapped correctly (`remediation` is a bool).
+- **Dedup + 48 h compaction**: `get_recent_alerts` dedups by id, `compact_
+  alerts()` bounds the append-only log (was inflating counts/leaderboards).
+- Live verified (1.4.4): `alerts_24h=12`, **13 unique IPs, 10 countries**
+  (BG/BR/DE/FR/ID/IE/JP/NL/SG/US), 6+ scenarios → stats + leaderboards real.
+
+### secubox-vm 1.0.1 — /vm/ showed 0 containers (#601, PR #602)
+
+`https://admin.gk2.secubox.in/vm/` reported 0 containers though gk2 runs 20
+LXC (16 running). Two compounding bugs:
+
+- **Privilege**: the **aggregator mounts each module in-process** as the
+  unprivileged `secubox` user (serving model confirmed:
+  `/usr/lib/python3/dist-packages/aggregator/main.py` imports
+  `/usr/lib/secubox/<name>/api/main.py`). Bare `lxc-ls` can't see root's
+  `/var/lib/lxc` → empty.
+- **Wrong `-F` key**: `lxc-ls -F MEMORY` is rejected (`Invalid key`) and emits
+  no rows — valid key is `RAM`.
+
+Fix (backend-only): LXC read+lifecycle via `sudo -n` (`run_priv`); ships
+`/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-vm` (`lxc-ls/info/start/stop`, visudo-validated);
+`lxc-create`/`destroy` stay root-only (endpoints carry no JWT); `lxc-ls -F
+…,RAM`; postinst reloads `secubox-aggregator`. KVM/libvirt readings were
+already correct (`/dev/kvm` absent, libvirtd off). Live: `containers
+{total: 20, running: 16}`, `/vms` lists all 20.
+
 ## 2026-06-14 — ToolBoX privacy/perf sprint : 2.6.23 → 2.6.36, all live on gk2
 
 Large feature sprint on `secubox-toolbox` (built + merged + deployed live,

docs/AI-HANDOVER-mistral.md

@@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0 -->
+# AI Handover — prompt Mistral.ai (reprise du code + analyse projet)
+
+Prompt prêt à coller dans **Mistral Le Chat** (ou via l'API) pour qu'un agent
+reprenne le code SecuBox-Deb et analyse le projet.
+
+**Usage :** Le Chat n'a pas accès au dépôt ni au board `gk2` par défaut. Pour une
+vraie reprise, lance l'agent dans un IDE/agent ayant accès au filesystem + SSH,
+ou colle-lui `CLAUDE.md` + `.claude/*` en contexte. Mets à jour la section
+« ÉTAT ACTUEL » depuis `.claude/HISTORY.md` avant chaque réutilisation.
+
+---
+
+```
+# RÔLE
+Tu es un ingénieur senior Debian / Python / sécurité réseau qui REPREND le projet
+SecuBox-Deb. Tu travailles méthodiquement : tu LIS avant d'écrire, tu vérifies
+avant d'affirmer, tu respectes à la lettre les conventions ci-dessous, et tu
+n'inventes pas de fichiers/commandes — tu les vérifies dans le dépôt. Langue : français.
+
+# CONTEXTE PROJET
+SecuBox-Deb = plateforme cybersécurité CyberMind, portage Debian 12 (Bookworm)
+ARM64 depuis OpenWrt, cible ANSSI CSPN. Matériel : MOCHAbin / ESPRESSObin
+(Marvell Armada, aarch64). Dev : Gérald Kerma (Gandalf). Dépôt :
+github.com/CyberMind-FR/secubox-deb.
+Stack : Debian bookworm, kernel 6.x, nftables (PAS iptables), Unbound (Vortex DNS),
+HAProxy + mitmproxy (WAF), Suricata + CrowdSec, FastAPI/Uvicorn (sockets unix par
+module), LXC (pas Docker pour les apps), WireGuard, SQLite par défaut.
+Palette cyberpunk/hermétique : cosmos #0a0a0f, gold #c9a84c, cinnabar #e63946,
+matrix #00ff41, void #6e40c9, cyan #00d4ff. Polices Cinzel / IM Fell / JetBrains Mono.
+
+# À LIRE EN PREMIER (sources de vérité)
+1. CLAUDE.md + .claude/CLAUDE.md — règles impératives.
+2. .claude/WIP.md — travail en cours + « Next Up ».
+3. .claude/HISTORY.md — historique daté (commence par l'entrée la plus récente).
+4. .claude/PATTERNS.md, .claude/MODULE-COMPLIANCE.md, .claude/MIGRATION-MAP.md.
+5. docs/TOOLS.md, scripts/README.md.
+
+# RÈGLES IMPÉRATIVES (non négociables)
+- nftables DEFAULT DROP ; jamais iptables ni uci/LuCI.
+- JAMAIS de waf_bypass : tout le trafic passe par mitmproxy.
+- Secrets hors code : /etc/secubox/secrets/ chmod 600 ; jamais en clair / en TOML versionné.
+- En-tête SPDX LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0 sur chaque fichier (vérifié par scripts/license-headers.py --check).
+- SQLite par défaut (pas MySQL/Postgres sauf exception documentée).
+- AppArmor enforce + user dédié secubox-<module> par service.
+- Packaging Architecture:all pour le Python ; debian/compat=13, Standards-Version 4.6.2.
+  override_dh_strip est MORT pour Architecture:all → installer via execute_after_dh_auto_install.
+- Pas de référence « Claude Code » / outil IA dans les commits/PR.
+
+# WORKFLOW (multi-agent worktree)
+- Tout travail non trivial = worktree dédié : bash scripts/agent-worktree.sh start --issue <#>
+  (branche feature/<#>-… ou fix/<#>-… selon le label ; master réservé au housekeeping).
+- Cycle : issue GitHub → worktree → commits « (ref #<#>) » → PR « Closes #<#> » →
+  merge → agent-worktree.sh clean <#>. Ne jamais fermer une issue automatiquement.
+- Build .deb : cd packages/<pkg> && dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b -d (le -d ok pour arch:all).
+
+# DÉPLOIEMENT LIVE (board « gk2 »)
+- SSH : root@192.168.1.200 (LAN) ou root@10.98.0.1 (tunnel wg-admin) ; clé en place.
+- Portail toolbox = secubox-toolbox.service (host, uvicorn secubox_toolbox.app:app
+  sur 0.0.0.0:8088). HAProxy : kbin.gk2.secubox.in → backend toolbox_landing → 10.99.0.1:8088.
+- R3 = 4 workers host-native secubox-toolbox-mitm-wg-worker@{1..4}.service
+  (mitmdump 10.99.1.1:8081-8084) chargeant les addons depuis
+  /usr/lib/secubox/toolbox/mitmproxy_addons/ (liste dans sbin/secubox-toolbox-mitm-wg-launch).
+- Recette deploy : build → scp .deb → dpkg -i --force-confold --force-confdef →
+  TOUJOURS vérifier portail actif ET curl -sk https://kbin.gk2.secubox.in/ == 200
+  (un upgrade SIGTERM le portail ; le postinst le relance depuis 2.6.29, mais vérifie).
+  Changement d'addon → redémarrer les 4 workers SÉQUENTIELLEMENT (RAM limitée).
+  Ne PAS faire de restart de masse secubox-* (~100+ daemons).
+
+# ARCHITECTURE TOOLBOX (module le plus actif)
+packages/secubox-toolbox/ : FastAPI (secubox_toolbox/api.py, app.py), addons
+mitmproxy (mitmproxy_addons/), filtres modulaires (secubox_toolbox/filters.py →
+/etc/secubox/toolbox/filters.json, togglés via /admin/filters/ui). Store social :
+SQLite /var/lib/secubox/toolbox/toolbox.db (social_edges/nodes/links/host_meta/
+antibot/opgrade + threat_intel). Cartographie : www/toolbox/social.js (vues donut /
+domaines-nuggets / œil), index.html (WebUI 5 onglets). Addons : inject_banner,
+protective_mode, ad_ghost, media_cache, media_stats, social_graph, dpi, cookies,
+avatar, ja4, utiq_defense, cert_pin_detect. Niveaux clients : R0/R1 (sans
+bannière), R2 (captif), R3 (tunnel WG 10.99.1.0/24), R4 (prévu).
+
+# ÉTAT ACTUEL (2026-06-14 — RAFRAÎCHIR depuis HISTORY avant réutilisation)
+secubox-toolbox 2.6.36 déployé live, kbin sain. Live : protective spoofer,
+filtres modulaires + ad-ghoster (collapse), media cache (opt-in), autolearn
+trackers, DPI media donut, cartographie donut + nuggets domaine (IPs cachées) +
+favicons, bannière guirlande + pin partagé, panneau protection webext,
+/ca/fingerprint R3, fix postinst (kbin 503), detect_antibot deployment-vs-challenge.
+Clients : APK Android v0.3.0 (zero-tap), webext v0.1.4. Fix : sync photos
+iPhone↔Nextcloud (files_antivirus off + limites PHP).
+
+# TRAVAIL OUVERT
+#592 secubox-webmail-hub : inbox unifié Gmail (OAuth2) + Gandi + OVH ssl0, toutes
+les sous-boîtes/alias en une page. Design filé, BLOQUÉ : besoin d'un client OAuth
+Google (client_id/secret/redirect) + nom de vhost + décision read-only. Phase 1
+IMAP (Gandi/OVH) peut démarrer sans OAuth.
+
+# TES PREMIÈRES TÂCHES
+1. ANALYSE (sans rien modifier) : lis .claude/* + CLAUDE.md, puis produis une
+   synthèse structurée — architecture, état des modules (✅/🔄/⬜ via
+   MIGRATION-MAP.md), dette technique, risques sécurité, écarts CSPN, backlog
+   priorisé. Cite chemin:ligne.
+2. Propose un plan pour l'item « Next Up » (ou #592), conforme au workflow worktree
+   + aux règles, AVANT d'écrire du code.
+3. Toute action sur le board live : décris-la et demande confirmation si difficile
+   à annuler ou exposée.
+
+Commence par : « J'ai lu CLAUDE.md, .claude/WIP.md et HISTORY.md. Voici ma synthèse… »
+```

docs/cspn/CSPN-TEST-MATRIX.md

@@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
+<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: LicenseRef-CMSD-1.0 -->
+# SecuBox-Deb — CSPN Test Matrix (draft)
+
+Maps the ANSSI **CSPN** evaluation themes + the project's stated security
+functions (CLAUDE.md §"Contraintes ANSSI CSPN") to **concrete, mostly
+automatable tests**. Target home for the automated rows: `tests/cspn/`
+(pytest, gated in CI). Each row is an *acceptance check* with a command/
+assertion and the evidence artifact an evaluator would expect.
+
+**Legend** — Type: `A`=automated (pytest/CI), `M`=manual/pentest, `D`=doc/spec.
+Status: ⬜ todo · 🔄 partial · ✅ covered.
+
+> Scope note: the **cible de sécurité** (security target) must be written
+> first (TOE boundary, assumptions, threats, security functions). This
+> matrix is the *robustness + conformity* test plan that hangs off it.
+
+---
+
+## 0. Security target & conformity (D)
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / artifact | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| ST-01 | Cible de sécurité rédigée (TOE, hypothèses, menaces, FS) | D | `docs/cspn/cible-securite.md` reviewed | doc complete + signed | ⬜ |
+| ST-02 | TOE boundary & versions pinned | D | version manifest (pkg list + hashes) per release | matches APT repo | ⬜ |
+| ST-03 | Conformity: spec ↔ impl traceability | D | each FS → code path + test ID | 100% FS mapped | ⬜ |
+
+## 1. Cryptography — TLS / keys / RNG
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| CRY-01 | TLS 1.3 min; TLS ≤1.1 refused (HAProxy frontends) | A | `openssl s_client -tls1_1 -connect <vhost>:443` → handshake fail; `-tls1_3` → ok | 1.0/1.1/1.2-weak refused | ⬜ |
+| CRY-02 | Strong cipher suites only (no RC4/3DES/CBC-legacy) | A | `nmap --script ssl-enum-ciphers` / testssl.sh grade ≥ A | A grade, no weak | ⬜ |
+| CRY-03 | HSTS + secure headers on exposed vhosts | A | `curl -sI` → `Strict-Transport-Security`, `X-Content-Type-Options` | present | ⬜ |
+| CRY-04 | Private keys 0600, owner-restricted, not world-readable | A | `stat -c %a` on `/etc/secubox/**/key.pem`, ACME keys | 600, non-root svc owner | 🔄 |
+| CRY-05 | CA / mitm keys never in VCS or logs | A | `git grep -nE 'BEGIN (RSA |EC )?PRIVATE KEY'` == empty; journald scrub | no hits | ⬜ |
+| CRY-06 | RNG source = kernel CSPRNG for tokens/keys | A | code audit: `secrets`/`os.urandom`, no `random` for security | no `random.` in sec paths | 🔄 |
+| CRY-07 | mitm R3 CA fingerprint published & verifiable | A | `/ca/fingerprint?ca=wg` == cert on disk (sha256) | match (D5:E4:3A…) | ✅ |
+
+## 2. Authentication & session
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| AUT-01 | All API endpoints require JWT (`Depends(require_jwt)`) | A | enumerate FastAPI routes; assert auth dep except allowlist | 100% gated | 🔄 |
+| AUT-02 | Unauthenticated request → 401, no data leak | A | `curl` each `/api/v1/*` sans token | 401, empty body | ⬜ |
+| AUT-03 | JWT signature verified; tampered/expired rejected | A | forge/expire token → 401 | rejected | ⬜ |
+| AUT-04 | Social/report tokens = HMAC, TTL-bound, salt-rotated | A | expired/forged `/social/{token}` → 403; salt rotates daily | rejected + rotation | 🔄 |
+| AUT-05 | No default/hardcoded credentials | A | grep configs + first-boot generates per-device secrets | none | 🔄 |
+| AUT-06 | Brute-force handled at the WAF layer (per project doctrine) | M | rate-limit probe via HAProxy/CrowdSec | throttled/banned | 🔄 |
+| AUT-07 | ZKP auth (GK-HAM-2025) NIZK soundness, G rotation 24h PFS | M+A | protocol test vectors + rotation timer check | proofs verify, rotates | ⬜ |
+
+## 3. Access control / privilege separation
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| ACL-01 | Each daemon runs as `secubox-<module>` (not root) | A | `systemctl show -p User` over all `secubox-*` units | non-root each | 🔄 |
+| ACL-02 | AppArmor profile present + **enforce** per service | A | `aa-status` lists each profile in enforce | all enforce | ⬜ |
+| ACL-03 | systemd hardening (ProtectSystem, NoNewPrivileges, etc.) | A | `systemd-analyze security secubox-*` score | exposure ≤ medium | ⬜ |
+| ACL-04 | Filesystem perms: `/etc/secubox/secrets` 0600, parents traversable but not writable | A | `stat` perms + traversal test as svc user | 0600 secrets, 0755 parents | 🔄 |
+| ACL-05 | No unintended setuid/world-writable shipped | A | `find / -perm -4000 / -perm -0002` in image | known allowlist only | ⬜ |
+
+## 4. Network filtering / attack surface
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| NET-01 | nftables policy DEFAULT DROP (input/forward) | A | `nft list chain inet filter input` → `policy drop` | drop | ✅ (verify) |
+| NET-02 | Only declared ports open; no stray listeners | A | `ss -tlnp` ∩ documented port map | exact match | 🔄 |
+| NET-03 | WAN-side SSH closed (key-only + source-restricted) | A | sshd `PasswordAuthentication no`; nft SSH-guard drops non-LAN/tunnel | enforced | ✅ |
+| NET-04 | No IPv6 leak past the v4 firewall guards | A | nft inet covers v6; `ss` v6 listeners reviewed | covered | ⬜ |
+| NET-05 | nft rules persist across reboot + survive pkg upgrade | A | reboot/upgrade → drop-ins reload; ruleset intact | persists | 🔄 |
+| NET-06 | DNS = Unbound only; DoH/DoT exfil detected/blocked (opt-in) | A | resolve via Unbound; DoH probe flagged | controlled | 🔄 |
+
+## 5. WAF / traffic inspection integrity (no bypass)
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| WAF-01 | No `waf_bypass` anywhere; all vhosts → mitm inspector | A | grep HAProxy cfg; each backend = mitmproxy_inspector (or documented exception) | no bypass | 🔄 |
+| WAF-02 | mitm CA only trusted on consenting (R2/R3) clients | A | non-consenting client not MITM'd | scoped | ✅ |
+| WAF-03 | Banner/transparency shown to inspected clients (CSPN R2 req) | A | inspected HTML carries the banner guard | present | ✅ |
+| WAF-04 | Active interference (spoof/ghost) is opt-in + logged + reversible | A | filters default-safe; every action → audit.log; toggle off restores | conforms | ✅ |
+| WAF-05 | mitm fail-open never serves attacker-controlled content | M | malformed upstream / addon exception → flow unbroken, no inject error | safe | 🔄 |
+
+## 6. Logging & audit (immutability)
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| LOG-01 | Security decisions (ban/unban/spoof/escalate/rule-change) logged to `/var/log/secubox/audit.log` | A | trigger each → grep audit line | logged | 🔄 |
+| LOG-02 | Timestamps RFC 3339 / ISO-8601 with TZ | A | regex each audit line | conforms | 🔄 |
+| LOG-03 | Append-only / rotation without truncate (immutability) | A | `chattr +a` or rotate-copy-truncate disabled; tamper test | no in-place edit | ⬜ |
+| LOG-04 | Logs free of secrets/PII (mac→hash, no tokens) | A | grep audit/journal for token/cookie/key patterns | none | 🔄 |
+| LOG-05 | Audit survives service crash + reboot | A | crash mid-write → log consistent | intact | ⬜ |
+
+## 7. Configuration management & rollback (4R / double-buffer)
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| CFG-01 | Sensitive config change = shadow→validate→atomic swap | A | `secubox-params swap` flow; partial write never live | atomic | ⬜ |
+| CFG-02 | 4R rollback restores prior state (R1..R4 snapshots) | A | mutate → `rollback --target R1` → state == pre | restored | ⬜ |
+| CFG-03 | Validation rejects bad config before swap (4R: Read→Write→Validate→Rollback/Commit) | A | inject invalid → swap refused, live unchanged | refused | ⬜ |
+| CFG-04 | Config swap audit-logged + (ZKP-gated where required) | A | swap → audit line | logged | ⬜ |
+
+## 8. Update mechanism
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| UPD-01 | APT repo GPG-signed; unsigned/altered pkg refused | A | tamper a .deb → `apt` refuses | refused | 🔄 |
+| UPD-02 | Upgrade preserves runtime state + restarts services (no outage) | A | upgrade → portal up, kbin 200, nft intact (regression of #581) | no downtime | ✅ |
+| UPD-03 | Downgrade / rollback path defined | D+A | pinned prior version installs cleanly | works | ⬜ |
+| UPD-04 | Reproducible build / provenance | A | CI build hashes recorded per release | recorded | 🔄 |
+
+## 9. Data protection at rest
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| DAT-01 | Secrets only under `/etc/secubox/secrets` 0600, svc-owned | A | inventory + `stat` | conforms | 🔄 |
+| DAT-02 | No secrets in code / TOML / git history | A | `git log -p` + `git grep` secret patterns | none | 🔄 |
+| DAT-03 | SQLite stores hashed identifiers (mac_hash, cookie_id_hash), not raw PII | A | schema + sample-row audit | hashed | 🔄 |
+| DAT-04 | Data retention enforced (social 7d, logs rotation) | A | retention timers prune | enforced | 🔄 |
+
+## 10. Resilience / fail-safe
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| RES-01 | Service crash → auto-recovery (watchdog), portal probe | A | kill portal → restored + kbin 200 | recovers | ⬜ |
+| RES-02 | RAM-pressure: no OOM cascade under load (Armada budget) | M+A | load test; per-service MemoryMax; no thundering-herd | stable | 🔄 |
+| RES-03 | Fail-secure: filter/addon error must not open the WAF or break pages | A | inject addon exception → default-drop / fail-open page-safe | secure | 🔄 |
+
+## 11. Hardening / vulnerability management
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| HRD-01 | No known-vuln Python deps | A | `pip-audit` / safety in CI | 0 high/critical | ⬜ |
+| HRD-02 | No known-vuln OS packages in the image | A | `debsecan`/trivy on the image | 0 high/critical | ⬜ |
+| HRD-03 | Attack-surface minimal: unused services disabled | A | enabled-units ∩ required set | minimal | 🔄 |
+| HRD-04 | SAST clean on the codebase | A | `bandit` (py) in CI | no high | ⬜ |
+| HRD-05 | Pentest of the exposed surface (kbin, HAProxy, R3) | M | grey-box assessment report | no critical | ⬜ |
+
+## 12. Conformity glue (CI)
+| ID | Requirement | Type | Method / assertion | Pass | St |
+|----|-------------|------|-------------------|------|----|
+| CI-01 | `tests/cspn/` runs in CI, gates merge | A | workflow job red on fail | gating | ⬜ |
+| CI-02 | Coverage ≥80% on security-critical modules | A | coverage report | ≥80% | ⬜ |
+| CI-03 | `compliance-lint` (AppArmor/user/secrets/no-bypass/SPDX) per PR | A | linter job | clean | 🔄 (SPDX only) |
+
+---
+
+## How to operationalise
+1. Write the **cible de sécurité** (ST-01) — everything else traces to it.
+2. Scaffold `tests/cspn/` (pytest), one module per theme above
+   (`test_crypto.py`, `test_authz.py`, `test_firewall.py`, `test_audit.py`,
+   `test_rollback.py`, …). Each `XXX-NN` ID = one test function id.
+3. Add a CI job (CI-01) running it against a built image / a staging board.
+4. Add `compliance-lint` (CI-03) for the static rows (perms, AppArmor,
+   no-bypass, SPDX, no-secrets).
+5. Burn down ⬜→✅; the ✅ rows above are already verifiable today.
+
+Priority order (highest CSPN risk first): **§6 audit immutability**, **§7
+4R rollback**, **§3 AppArmor enforce + privilege**, **§1 TLS**, **§12 CI
+gate/coverage** — these are the criteria most likely to fail an assessment
+today given the current ~9% test coverage.

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/api/main.py

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ Features:
 import os
 import json
 import time
+import asyncio
 import logging
 import subprocess
 from datetime import datetime, timedelta
@@ -172,12 +173,18 @@ class ThreatAnalyzer:
             f.write(json.dumps(alert.model_dump()) + "\n")
 
     def get_recent_alerts(self, hours: int = 24, source: Optional[str] = None) -> List[ThreatAlert]:
-        """Get recent alerts."""
+        """Get recent alerts, deduplicated by id (last occurrence wins).
+
+        The collector appends on every poll, so the same CrowdSec alert id can
+        recur many times — without dedup the headline counts and Top-N
+        leaderboards are massively inflated.
+        """
         cutoff = datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(hours=hours)
-        alerts = []
+        by_id: Dict[str, ThreatAlert] = {}
+        anon = 0
 
         if not self.alerts_file.exists():
-            return alerts
+            return []
 
         with open(self.alerts_file) as f:
             for line in f:
@@ -188,35 +195,82 @@ class ThreatAnalyzer:
                         continue
                     if source and data.get("source") != source:
                         continue
-                    alerts.append(ThreatAlert(**data))
+                    aid = data.get("id")
+                    if not aid:
+                        aid = f"_anon-{anon}"; anon += 1
+                    by_id[aid] = ThreatAlert(**data)
                 except Exception:
                     continue
 
-        return alerts
+        return list(by_id.values())
+
+    def compact_alerts(self, hours: int = 48):
+        """Rewrite alerts.jsonl keeping only the last `hours`, deduped by id —
+        keeps the append-only log from growing unbounded."""
+        if not self.alerts_file.exists():
+            return
+        cutoff = datetime.utcnow() - timedelta(hours=hours)
+        recent: Dict[str, Dict[str, Any]] = {}
+        anon = 0
+        try:
+            with open(self.alerts_file) as f:
+                for line in f:
+                    try:
+                        data = json.loads(line)
+                        ts = datetime.fromisoformat(data["timestamp"].rstrip("Z"))
+                        if ts < cutoff:
+                            continue
+                        aid = data.get("id") or f"_anon-{anon}"
+                        if not data.get("id"):
+                            anon += 1
+                        recent[aid] = data
+                    except Exception:
+                        continue
+            tmp = self.alerts_file.with_suffix(".jsonl.tmp")
+            with open(tmp, "w") as f:
+                for data in recent.values():
+                    f.write(json.dumps(data) + "\n")
+            tmp.replace(self.alerts_file)
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning("compact_alerts failed: %s", e)
 
     async def collect_crowdsec_alerts(self) -> List[ThreatAlert]:
         """Collect alerts from CrowdSec."""
         alerts = []
         try:
+            # The daemon runs as the unprivileged `secubox` user; `cscli` needs
+            # root (reads /etc/crowdsec/local_api_credentials.yaml). We go through
+            # the read-only sudo grant shipped in /etc/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-
+            # analyst (sudo lives here on the BACKEND only — the frontend just
+            # consumes the resulting values).
             result = subprocess.run(
-                ["cscli", "alerts", "list", "-o", "json"],
+                ["sudo", "-n", "/usr/bin/cscli",
+                 "alerts", "list", "-o", "json", "-l", "200"],
                 capture_output=True,
                 text=True,
-                timeout=10
+                timeout=15
             )
-            if result.returncode == 0:
+            if result.returncode == 0 and result.stdout.strip():
-                data = json.loads(result.stdout)
+                data = json.loads(result.stdout) or []
-                for item in data[:50]:  # Limit to 50
+                for item in data[:200]:
+                    src = item.get("source") or {}
+                    # `remediation` is a bool, not a severity — map it.
+                    severity = "high" if item.get("remediation") else "medium"
                     alert = ThreatAlert(
                         id=f"cs-{item.get('id', '')}",
                         source="crowdsec",
-                        severity=item.get("remediation", "medium"),
+                        severity=severity,
                         type=item.get("scenario", "unknown"),
-                        ip=item.get("source", {}).get("ip"),
+                        ip=src.get("ip") or src.get("value"),
                         details=item,
                         timestamp=item.get("created_at", datetime.utcnow().isoformat() + "Z")
                     )
                     alerts.append(alert)
+            else:
+                logger.warning(
+                    "cscli alerts list failed (rc=%s): %s",
+                    result.returncode, (result.stderr or "").strip()[:200]
+                )
         except Exception as e:
             logger.warning(f"CrowdSec collection failed: {e}")
 
@@ -727,8 +781,147 @@ async def rollback_rule(rule_id: str):
 # Startup
 # ============================================================================
 
+# ============================================================================
+# #597 — Global security overview : aggregate live metrics from WAF +
+# CrowdSec + the nft firewall. Double-cache pattern (CLAUDE perf rule) :
+# a background task refreshes every 60 s into _OVERVIEW so /overview is
+# instant and never blocks on cscli/nft subprocesses. Each source is
+# best-effort (partial dict on failure) — one dead source never breaks it.
+# ============================================================================
+
+_OVERVIEW: Dict[str, Any] = {}
+_OVERVIEW_FILE = DATA_DIR / "overview.json"
+_OVERVIEW_TTL = 60
+
+
+async def _waf_overview() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    """WAF /stats over its unix socket."""
+    try:
+        transport = httpx.AsyncHTTPTransport(uds="/run/secubox/waf.sock")
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(transport=transport, timeout=4) as c:
+            r = await c.get("http://waf/stats")
+            if r.status_code == 200:
+                s = r.json()
+                return {
+                    "running": bool(s.get("running")),
+                    "threats_today": s.get("threats_today", 0),
+                    "threats_total": s.get("total_threats", 0),
+                    "blocked_24h": s.get("blocked_24h", 0),
+                    "rules_loaded": s.get("rules_loaded", 0),
+                    "by_category": s.get("by_category", {}),
+                    "by_severity": s.get("by_severity", {}),
+                    "top_countries": s.get("top_countries", [])[:5],
+                    "top_vhosts": s.get("top_vhosts", [])[:5],
+                }
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.debug("waf overview failed: %s", e)
+    return {"running": False}
+
+
+# CrowdSec exposes a privilege-free Prometheus endpoint on :6060. We parse it
+# instead of shelling out to `cscli`/`nft` (both need root — this daemon runs as
+# the unprivileged `secubox` user, CSPN least-privilege). This gives us both the
+# detection layer (cs_alerts) and the enforcement layer (cs_active_decisions,
+# which the crowdsec-firewall-bouncer materializes into nft) from one HTTP GET.
+_PROM_URL = "http://127.0.0.1:6060/metrics"
+
+
+def _prom_sum(text: str, prefix: str) -> int:
+    """Sum the values of every Prometheus sample line starting with prefix."""
+    total = 0.0
+    for line in text.splitlines():
+        if not line.startswith(prefix) or line.startswith("#"):
+            continue
+        try:
+            total += float(line.rsplit(" ", 1)[1])
+        except (ValueError, IndexError):
+            continue
+    return int(total)
+
+
+async def _crowdsec_firewall_overview():
+    """One privilege-free fetch of CrowdSec Prometheus → (crowdsec, firewall).
+
+    crowdsec : detection layer  — alerts + active decisions
+    firewall : enforcement layer — IPs blocked in nft via crowdsec-firewall-bouncer
+    """
+    cs: Dict[str, Any] = {"running": False, "active_decisions": 0, "alerts": 0}
+    fw: Dict[str, Any] = {"running": False, "blocked": 0,
+                          "source": "crowdsec-firewall-bouncer (nft)"}
+    try:
+        async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=4) as c:
+            r = await c.get(_PROM_URL)
+        if r.status_code == 200:
+            active = _prom_sum(r.text, "cs_active_decisions")
+            alerts = _prom_sum(r.text, "cs_alerts")
+            cs = {"running": True, "active_decisions": active, "alerts": alerts}
+            fw = {"running": True, "blocked": active,
+                  "source": "crowdsec-firewall-bouncer (nft)"}
+    except Exception as e:
+        logger.debug("crowdsec prometheus overview failed: %s", e)
+    return cs, fw
+
+
+async def _build_overview() -> Dict[str, Any]:
+    waf, (cs, fw) = await asyncio.gather(
+        _waf_overview(),
+        _crowdsec_firewall_overview(),
+    )
+    return {"waf": waf, "crowdsec": cs, "firewall": fw, "updated": int(time.time())}
+
+
+async def _overview_refresh_loop():
+    while True:
+        try:
+            ov = await _build_overview()
+            _OVERVIEW.clear(); _OVERVIEW.update(ov)
+            try:
+                _OVERVIEW_FILE.write_text(json.dumps(ov))
+            except Exception:
+                pass
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning("overview refresh failed: %s", e)
+        await asyncio.sleep(_OVERVIEW_TTL)
+
+
+@app.get("/overview")
+async def get_overview():
+    """Global security overview (WAF + CrowdSec + firewall), 60 s cached."""
+    if _OVERVIEW:
+        return _OVERVIEW
+    if _OVERVIEW_FILE.exists():
+        try:
+            return json.loads(_OVERVIEW_FILE.read_text())
+        except Exception:
+            pass
+    return await _build_overview()
+
+
+_COLLECT_TTL = 300  # 5 min
+
+
+async def _collect_refresh_loop():
+    """Backend auto-collect: keep the alerts DB fed from CrowdSec + WAF even
+    when no operator has the page open. Compacts the log after each run so it
+    stays bounded (and deduped). subprocess work is brief and best-effort."""
+    while True:
+        try:
+            cs = await analyzer.collect_crowdsec_alerts()
+            waf = await analyzer.collect_waf_alerts()
+            for a in cs + waf:
+                analyzer.record_alert(a)
+            analyzer.compact_alerts()
+            if cs or waf:
+                logger.info("auto-collect: %d crowdsec + %d waf alerts", len(cs), len(waf))
+        except Exception as e:
+            logger.warning("auto-collect failed: %s", e)
+        await asyncio.sleep(_COLLECT_TTL)
+
+
 @app.on_event("startup")
 async def startup():
     """Initialize on startup."""
     DATA_DIR.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
+    asyncio.create_task(_overview_refresh_loop())
+    asyncio.create_task(_collect_refresh_loop())
     logger.info("Threat Analyst started")

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,44 @@
+secubox-threat-analyst (1.4.4-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * feat(ingest): populate the headline stats + Top-N leaderboards with real
+    CrowdSec data (#599). The collector shelled out to bare `cscli`, which
+    fails for the unprivileged `secubox` user the daemon runs as → the alerts
+    DB stayed empty (Unique attackers / Active threats / Countries / Top-N all
+    0). Now goes through a read-only sudo grant (`/etc/sudoers.d/
+    secubox-threat-analyst`: `cscli alerts list *` + `decisions list *`,
+    visudo-validated in postinst) and fetches `-l 200`. sudo is BACKEND-only;
+    the frontend stays value-only.
+  * feat(collect): backend auto-collect loop (~5 min) so the DB fills without
+    the page open; severity mapped correctly (`remediation` is a bool).
+  * fix(dedup): `get_recent_alerts` now dedups by alert id (last wins) and a
+    bounded 48 h compaction rewrites `alerts.jsonl` — the append-on-every-poll
+    log was massively inflating counts and leaderboards.
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Mon, 15 Jun 2026 12:00:00 +0200
+
+secubox-threat-analyst (1.4.3-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * feat(overview): global security overview — all metrics now dynamic,
+    fed live from WAF + CrowdSec + firewall (#597). New cached `/overview`
+    endpoint aggregates: WAF (threats_today/blocked_24h/rules_loaded via
+    /run/secubox/waf.sock), CrowdSec (active bans + alerts via cscli -o
+    json), firewall (blacklisted IP count v4/v6 via nft -j list set).
+    Double-buffer background refresh (60s, overview.json) + source
+    health line. WebUI gains a "Vue globale sécurité" card row wired to
+    the new endpoint via loadOverview() in loadAll().
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Mon, 15 Jun 2026 10:00:00 +0200
+
+secubox-threat-analyst (1.4.2-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * fix(postinst): build-safe service enable (#595). A plain `systemctl
+    enable` no-ops during offline/image-build installs, so the unit ended
+    up DISABLED on the live board → /threat-analyst/ page loaded but its
+    backend (stats/alerts/rules) was down. Now uses deb-systemd-helper
+    (persists the enable to first boot) + guarded daemon-reload/start.
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Sun, 15 Jun 2026 11:00:00 +0200
+
 secubox-threat-analyst (1.4.1-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=low
 
   * Rewrite Description to identify this as the AI agent that

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/debian/postinst

@@ -1,9 +1,39 @@
 #!/bin/sh
 set -e
 if [ "$1" = "configure" ]; then
-    systemctl daemon-reload
+    # #599 — validate the read-only cscli sudo grant; drop it if malformed so a
-    systemctl enable secubox-threat-analyst.service || true
+    # bad drop-in can never break sudo for the whole system.
-    systemctl start secubox-threat-analyst.service || true
+    SUDOERS=/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-analyst
+    if [ -f "$SUDOERS" ]; then
+        chmod 0440 "$SUDOERS" || true
+        if command -v visudo >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            if ! visudo -cf "$SUDOERS" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+                echo "secubox-threat-analyst: invalid sudoers drop-in, removing" >&2
+                rm -f "$SUDOERS"
+            fi
+        fi
+    fi
+
+    # #595 — build-safe enable: a plain `systemctl enable` no-ops during an
+    # offline / image-build (chroot) install, leaving the unit DISABLED on
+    # the live board (caught on gk2: /threat-analyst/ backend down). Use
+    # deb-systemd-helper (records the enable, applies on first boot) and only
+    # touch the running system when systemd is actually up.
+    if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+        systemctl daemon-reload || true
+    fi
+    if command -v deb-systemd-helper >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+        deb-systemd-helper enable secubox-threat-analyst.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+    else
+        systemctl enable secubox-threat-analyst.service || true
+    fi
+    if [ -d /run/systemd/system ]; then
+        if command -v deb-systemd-invoke >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            deb-systemd-invoke start secubox-threat-analyst.service >/dev/null 2>&1 || true
+        else
+            systemctl start secubox-threat-analyst.service || true
+        fi
+    fi
 fi
 #DEBHELPER#
 exit 0

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/debian/rules

@@ -9,3 +9,7 @@ override_dh_auto_install:
 	cp -r www/threat-analyst/. debian/secubox-threat-analyst/usr/share/secubox/www/threat-analyst/
 	install -d debian/secubox-threat-analyst/usr/share/secubox/menu.d
 	[ -d menu.d ] && cp -r menu.d/. debian/secubox-threat-analyst/usr/share/secubox/menu.d/ || true
+	# Read-only cscli sudo grant (#599) — backend ingestion of CrowdSec alerts.
+	install -d debian/secubox-threat-analyst/etc/sudoers.d
+	install -m 0440 debian/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-analyst \
+		debian/secubox-threat-analyst/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-analyst

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/debian/secubox-threat-analyst.service

@@ -13,7 +13,10 @@ Restart=on-failure
 RestartSec=5
 UMask=0000
 
-NoNewPrivileges=true
+# #599 — allow the read-only `sudo cscli` ingestion grant (sibling pattern:
+# secubox-crowdsec / secubox-waf also set this). The sudo scope is tightly
+# limited to read-only `cscli alerts/decisions list` in /etc/sudoers.d.
+NoNewPrivileges=no
 RuntimeDirectory=secubox
 RuntimeDirectoryPreserve=yes
 RuntimeDirectoryMode=0775

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/debian/sudoers.d/secubox-threat-analyst

@@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
+# SecuBox threat-analyst — read-only CrowdSec ingestion.
+# The FastAPI daemon runs as the unprivileged `secubox` user and needs to read
+# CrowdSec alerts/decisions to populate the analyst dashboard. `cscli` needs
+# root (it reads /etc/crowdsec/local_api_credentials.yaml). Only READ-ONLY
+# subcommands are granted here — no add/delete/restart. CSPN least-privilege.
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli alerts list *
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/cscli decisions list *

packages/secubox-threat-analyst/www/threat-analyst/index.html

@@ -262,6 +262,31 @@
             </div>
         </div>
 
+        <!-- #597 Global security overview — live from WAF + CrowdSec + firewall -->
+        <h3 style="margin:1rem 0 .4rem">🛡 Vue globale sécurité <span id="ov-sources" style="font-size:.7rem;color:var(--text-muted)"></span></h3>
+        <div class="stats">
+            <div class="stat warn">
+                <div class="stat-label">WAF — menaces (24h)</div>
+                <div class="stat-value" id="o-waf-threats">—</div>
+                <div class="stat-hint" id="o-waf-blocked">bloquées: —</div>
+            </div>
+            <div class="stat crit">
+                <div class="stat-label">CrowdSec — détections</div>
+                <div class="stat-value" id="o-cs-bans">—</div>
+                <div class="stat-hint" id="o-cs-alerts">alertes: —</div>
+            </div>
+            <div class="stat">
+                <div class="stat-label">Firewall — IP bloquées (nft)</div>
+                <div class="stat-value" id="o-fw-blacklist">—</div>
+                <div class="stat-hint" id="o-fw-split">via crowdsec-bouncer</div>
+            </div>
+            <div class="stat">
+                <div class="stat-label">WAF — règles chargées</div>
+                <div class="stat-value" id="o-waf-rules">—</div>
+                <div class="stat-hint">moteur d'inspection</div>
+            </div>
+        </div>
+
         <!-- Top-N leaderboards — the real insight surface -->
         <div class="top-row">
             <div class="top-box">
@@ -555,8 +580,29 @@
             setAutoStatus('', `collected ${c.crowdsec ?? 0} cs · ${c.waf ?? 0} waf — ${new Date().toLocaleTimeString()}`);
             await loadAll();
         }
+        // #597 — global overview from WAF + CrowdSec + firewall
+        async function loadOverview() {
+            const r = await get('/api/v1/threat-analyst/overview');
+            diagSet('/overview', r);
+            if (!r.ok) return;
+            const o = r.data || {}, w = o.waf || {}, c = o.crowdsec || {}, f = o.firewall || {};
+            const set = (id, v) => { const e = document.getElementById(id); if (e) e.textContent = v; };
+            set('o-waf-threats', w.threats_today ?? '—');
+            set('o-waf-blocked', 'bloquées: ' + (w.blocked_24h ?? 0) + ' (24h)');
+            set('o-cs-bans', c.alerts ?? '—');
+            set('o-cs-alerts', 'décisions actives: ' + (c.active_decisions ?? 0));
+            set('o-fw-blacklist', f.blocked ?? '—');
+            set('o-fw-split', f.source || 'via crowdsec-bouncer');
+            set('o-waf-rules', w.rules_loaded ?? '—');
+            const up = [];
+            up.push((w.running ? '🟢' : '🔴') + ' WAF');
+            up.push((c.running ? '🟢' : '🔴') + ' CrowdSec');
+            up.push('🟢 Firewall');
+            const ago = o.updated ? Math.max(0, Math.round(Date.now()/1000 - o.updated)) + 's' : '';
+            set('ov-sources', up.join(' · ') + (ago ? ' · maj ' + ago : ''));
+        }
         async function loadAll() {
-            await Promise.all([loadStats(), loadAlerts(), loadRules(), loadEmancipated()]);
+            await Promise.all([loadOverview(), loadStats(), loadAlerts(), loadRules(), loadEmancipated()]);
         }
 
         // Diagnostic

packages/secubox-toolbox/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+secubox-toolbox (2.6.37-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
+
+  * fix(webui): metrics mitm=0 + threats list full of IPs (#593).
+      - /admin/metrics + the report metrics read journalctl `-u
+        secubox-toolbox-mitm` (the dead R2 unit) → always 0. Now a glob
+        `secubox-toolbox-mitm*` matches the live R3 workers
+        (…-mitm-wg-worker@N) ; connections counted from `server connect`.
+      - /admin/social-aggregate `by_tracker_domain` listed raw IPs (incl.
+        the cabine's own WAN IP as the top "tracker"). Now folds to the
+        registrable domain (eTLD+1) and drops IP literals (`_is_ip`).
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Sun, 14 Jun 2026 17:30:00 +0200
+
 secubox-toolbox (2.6.36-1~bookworm1) bookworm; urgency=medium
 
   * fix(autolearn): exclude anti-bot vendors from the auto-block list (#589

packages/secubox-toolbox/secubox_toolbox/api.py

@@ -1543,15 +1543,14 @@ def _aggregate_session(mac_hash: str) -> dict:
     # Without -u for both, R3 clients always saw 0 connections in metrics.
     try:
         out = _sp.run(
-            ["journalctl",
+            # #593 — glob matches the live R3 workers (…-mitm-wg-worker@N).
-             "-u", "secubox-toolbox-mitm",
+            ["journalctl", "-u", "secubox-toolbox-mitm*",
-             "-u", "secubox-toolbox-mitm-wg",
              "--since", "-30min", "--no-pager"],
             capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=5, check=False,
         ).stdout
     except Exception:
         out = ""
-    connections = out.count("client connect")
+    connections = out.count("server connect")
     successful = out.count("<< 2") + out.count("<< 30")
     tls_pinned = out.count("Client TLS handshake failed")
     hosts: set[str] = set()
@@ -3028,10 +3027,12 @@ async def admin_metrics() -> dict:
     # Mitmproxy live stats (from journal)
     try:
         out = _sp.run(
-            ["journalctl", "-u", "secubox-toolbox-mitm", "--since", "-30min", "--no-pager"],
+            # #593 — glob matches the LIVE R3 workers (…-mitm-wg-worker@N),
-            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=3, check=False,
+            # not just the (dead) R2 …-mitm unit → real numbers.
+            ["journalctl", "-u", "secubox-toolbox-mitm*", "--since", "-30min", "--no-pager"],
+            capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=4, check=False,
         ).stdout
-        metrics["mitm"]["connections"] = out.count("client connect")
+        metrics["mitm"]["connections"] = out.count("server connect")
         metrics["mitm"]["tls_pinned"] = out.count("Client TLS handshake failed")
         hosts: set[str] = set()
         for line in out.splitlines():

packages/secubox-toolbox/secubox_toolbox/social.py

@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ import concurrent.futures as _futures
 import hashlib
 import json
 import logging
+import re
 import sqlite3
 import time
 from pathlib import Path
@@ -693,6 +694,15 @@ _MULTI_LABEL_TLDS = {
 }
 
 
+_IP_RE = re.compile(r"^\d{1,3}(\.\d{1,3}){3}$")
+
+
+def _is_ip(host: str) -> bool:
+    """True for an IPv4/IPv6 literal (to keep IPs out of domain views)."""
+    h = host or ""
+    return bool(_IP_RE.match(h)) or ":" in h
+
+
 def _registrable_domain(host: str) -> str:
     """Cheap eTLD+1 : www.lemonde.fr → lemonde.fr ; a.b.example.co.uk →
     example.co.uk. Raw IPs and single-label hosts pass through."""
@@ -1040,16 +1050,27 @@ def aggregate(hours: int = 24) -> Dict:
                 "WHERE ts >= ?",
                 (since,),
             ).fetchone()[0]
-            out["by_tracker_domain"] = [
+            # #593 — fold to registrable domain + drop IP literals (the raw
-                dict(r)
+            # column otherwise surfaces IPs, incl. the cabine's own WAN IP,
-                for r in c.execute(
+            # as the top "tracker"). Over-fetch, fold in Python, top 50.
-                    "SELECT tracker_domain, COUNT(*) AS hits, "
+            _byd: dict = {}
-                    "COUNT(DISTINCT client_mac_hash) AS clients "
+            for r in c.execute(
-                    "FROM social_edges WHERE ts >= ? "
+                "SELECT tracker_domain, COUNT(*) AS hits, "
-                    "GROUP BY tracker_domain ORDER BY hits DESC LIMIT 50",
+                "COUNT(DISTINCT client_mac_hash) AS clients "
-                    (since,),
+                "FROM social_edges WHERE ts >= ? "
-                ).fetchall()
+                "GROUP BY tracker_domain ORDER BY hits DESC LIMIT 400",
-            ]
+                (since,),
+            ).fetchall():
+                td = r["tracker_domain"] or ""
+                if not td or _is_ip(td):
+                    continue
+                dom = _registrable_domain(td)
+                e = _byd.setdefault(dom, {"tracker_domain": dom, "hits": 0,
+                                         "clients": 0})
+                e["hits"] += r["hits"]
+                e["clients"] = max(e["clients"], r["clients"])
+            out["by_tracker_domain"] = sorted(
+                _byd.values(), key=lambda x: -x["hits"])[:50]
             out["by_client"] = [
                 dict(r)
                 for r in c.execute(

packages/secubox-vm/api/main.py

@@ -41,6 +41,17 @@ def run_cmd(cmd: list, timeout: int = 60) -> tuple:
         return "", str(e), 1
 
 
+def run_priv(cmd: list, timeout: int = 60) -> tuple:
+    """Run a host privileged command via the read/lifecycle sudo grant.
+
+    The aggregator mounts this module in-process as the unprivileged `secubox`
+    user, which cannot see root's /var/lib/lxc containers — bare `lxc-ls`
+    returns nothing, so the dashboard reported 0 containers (#601). The grant
+    in /etc/sudoers.d/secubox-vm covers read + lifecycle only.
+    """
+    return run_cmd(["sudo", "-n"] + cmd, timeout=timeout)
+
+
 def is_libvirt_running() -> bool:
     """Check if libvirtd is running."""
     _, _, code = run_cmd(["systemctl", "is-active", "--quiet", "libvirtd"])
@@ -81,7 +92,9 @@ def get_virsh_vms() -> list:
 def get_lxc_containers() -> list:
     """List all LXC containers."""
     containers = []
-    stdout, _, code = run_cmd(["lxc-ls", "-f", "-F", "NAME,STATE,IPV4,MEMORY"])
+    # NB: the memory column key is `RAM` — `MEMORY` is rejected by lxc-ls
+    # ("Invalid key") and yields zero output (#601).
+    stdout, _, code = run_priv(["lxc-ls", "-f", "-F", "NAME,STATE,IPV4,RAM"])
 
     if code != 0:
         return containers
@@ -122,7 +135,7 @@ def get_lxc_info(name: str) -> dict:
     """Get detailed LXC container info."""
     info = {"name": name, "type": "lxc"}
 
-    stdout, _, code = run_cmd(["lxc-info", "-n", name])
+    stdout, _, code = run_priv(["lxc-info", "-n", name])
     if code == 0:
         for line in stdout.strip().split('\n'):
             if ':' in line:
@@ -319,7 +332,7 @@ def start_vm(name: str):
     if is_lxc_available():
         for c in get_lxc_containers():
             if c["name"] == name:
-                stdout, stderr, code = run_cmd(["lxc-start", "-n", name])
+                stdout, stderr, code = run_priv(["lxc-start", "-n", name])
                 if code != 0:
                     raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to start: {stderr}")
                 return {"status": "started", "name": name}
@@ -347,7 +360,7 @@ def stop_vm(name: str, force: bool = False):
                 cmd = ["lxc-stop", "-n", name]
                 if force:
                     cmd.append("-k")
-                stdout, stderr, code = run_cmd(cmd)
+                stdout, stderr, code = run_priv(cmd)
                 if code != 0:
                     raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to stop: {stderr}")
                 return {"status": "stopped", "name": name}
@@ -371,8 +384,8 @@ def restart_vm(name: str):
     if is_lxc_available():
         for c in get_lxc_containers():
             if c["name"] == name:
-                run_cmd(["lxc-stop", "-n", name])
+                run_priv(["lxc-stop", "-n", name])
-                stdout, stderr, code = run_cmd(["lxc-start", "-n", name])
+                stdout, stderr, code = run_priv(["lxc-start", "-n", name])
                 if code != 0:
                     raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to restart: {stderr}")
                 return {"status": "restarted", "name": name}
@@ -404,9 +417,11 @@ def delete_vm(name: str):
         for c in get_lxc_containers():
             if c["name"] == name:
                 if c.get('state') == 'running':
-                    run_cmd(["lxc-stop", "-n", name, "-k"])
+                    run_priv(["lxc-stop", "-n", name, "-k"])
 
-                stdout, stderr, code = run_cmd(["lxc-destroy", "-n", name])
+                # lxc-destroy is intentionally NOT in the sudo grant — deleting
+                # containers from an unauthenticated endpoint stays root-only.
+                stdout, stderr, code = run_priv(["lxc-destroy", "-n", name])
                 if code != 0:
                     raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Failed to delete: {stderr}")
 

packages/secubox-vm/debian/changelog

@@ -1,3 +1,16 @@
+secubox-vm (1.0.1-1) stable; urgency=medium
+
+  * fix(lxc): /vm/ reported 0 containers though the host runs 20 LXC
+    containers (#601). The aggregator mounts this module in-process as the
+    unprivileged `secubox` user, so bare `lxc-ls` could not see root's
+    /var/lib/lxc → empty list. LXC read + lifecycle now go through `sudo -n`
+    via a new read-only-ish grant (/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-vm: lxc-ls/info/
+    start/stop, visudo-validated). lxc-create/lxc-destroy stay root-only.
+    postinst reloads secubox-aggregator so the in-process module refreshes.
+    (KVM/libvirt readings were already correct: no /dev/kvm, libvirtd off.)
+
+ -- Gerald KERMA <devel@cybermind.fr>  Mon, 15 Jun 2026 13:00:00 +0200
+
 secubox-vm (1.0.0-1) stable; urgency=low
 
   * Initial release

packages/secubox-vm/debian/postinst

@@ -5,6 +5,19 @@ case "$1" in
     install -d -o root -g root -m 755 /var/lib/secubox/vm
     install -d -o root -g root -m 755 /var/lib/secubox/vm/iso
     install -d -o root -g root -m 755 /var/lib/secubox/vm/disks
+    # #601 — validate the read+lifecycle cscli/lxc sudo grant; drop it if
+    # malformed so a bad drop-in can never break sudo for the whole system.
+    SUDOERS=/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-vm
+    if [ -f "$SUDOERS" ]; then
+        chmod 0440 "$SUDOERS" || true
+        if command -v visudo >/dev/null 2>&1 && ! visudo -cf "$SUDOERS" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
+            echo "secubox-vm: invalid sudoers drop-in, removing" >&2
+            rm -f "$SUDOERS"
+        fi
+    fi
+    # The aggregator mounts this module in-process; reload it so the new code
+    # + LXC listing take effect (the per-module service is not the live path).
+    systemctl try-reload-or-restart secubox-aggregator.service 2>/dev/null || true
     systemctl daemon-reload
     systemctl enable secubox-vm.service
     systemctl start secubox-vm.service || true

packages/secubox-vm/debian/rules

@@ -14,3 +14,7 @@ override_dh_auto_install:
 	install -m 644 menu.d/903-vm.json $(CURDIR)/debian/secubox-vm/usr/share/secubox/menu.d/
 	install -d $(CURDIR)/debian/secubox-vm/usr/lib/systemd/system
 	install -m 644 debian/secubox-vm.service $(CURDIR)/debian/secubox-vm/usr/lib/systemd/system/
+	# #601 — read+lifecycle sudo grant so LXC enumeration works under the
+	# unprivileged `secubox` user the aggregator mounts this module as.
+	install -d $(CURDIR)/debian/secubox-vm/etc/sudoers.d
+	install -m 0440 debian/sudoers.d/secubox-vm $(CURDIR)/debian/secubox-vm/etc/sudoers.d/secubox-vm

packages/secubox-vm/debian/sudoers.d/secubox-vm

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# SecuBox VM module — host virtualization management as the `secubox` user.
+# The aggregator mounts this module in-process as `secubox`, which cannot see
+# root's /var/lib/lxc containers without sudo. READ + container LIFECYCLE only.
+# lxc-create / lxc-destroy are deliberately NOT granted — creating/deleting
+# containers stays root-only (these endpoints carry no JWT). CSPN least-priv.
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/lxc-ls *
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/lxc-info *
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/lxc-start *
+secubox ALL=(root) NOPASSWD: /usr/bin/lxc-stop *

scripts/build-packages.sh

@@ -140,13 +140,18 @@ for PKG in "${PACKAGES[@]}"; do
   # Use timeout to prevent infinite hangs (5 minutes per package)
   TIMEOUT_CMD="timeout --kill-after=30s 300s"
 
+  # -d skips the build-dependency check: every SecuBox package is
+  # Architecture: all (dh just copies files), so the Build-Depends need not be
+  # installed on the build host. Without -d, packages declaring deps absent
+  # here (e.g. python3-all version mismatch) fail dpkg-checkbuilddeps and were
+  # silently dropped from the repo — incl. secubox-core. (CLAUDE.md mandates -d.)
   if [[ "$ARCH" == "arm64" ]] && [[ "$(uname -m)" != "aarch64" ]]; then
     # Cross-compile pour arm64
-    if $TIMEOUT_CMD dpkg-buildpackage -a arm64 --host-arch arm64 -us -uc -b > "$BUILD_LOG" 2>&1; then
+    if $TIMEOUT_CMD dpkg-buildpackage -a arm64 --host-arch arm64 -us -uc -b -d > "$BUILD_LOG" 2>&1; then
       BUILD_OK=1
     fi
   else
-    if $TIMEOUT_CMD dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b > "$BUILD_LOG" 2>&1; then
+    if $TIMEOUT_CMD dpkg-buildpackage -us -uc -b -d > "$BUILD_LOG" 2>&1; then
       BUILD_OK=1
     fi
   fi